cover

The Quest for a Moral Compass

Abstract

The story of the global search for moral truths In this remarkable and groundbreaking book, Kenan Malik explores the history of moral thought as it has developed over three millennia, from Homer's Greece to Mao's China, from ancient India to modern America. It tells the stories of the great philosophers, and breathes life into their ideas, while also challenging many of our most cherished moral beliefs. Engaging and provocative, The Quest for a Moral Compass confronts some of humanity's deepest questions. Where do values come from? Is God necessary for moral guidance? Are there absolute moral truths? It also brings morality down to earth, showing how, throughout history, social needs and political desires have shaped moral thinking. It is a history of the world told through the history of moral thought, and a history of moral thought that casts new light on global history.Extracted Annotations (11/19/2022, 4:41:57 AM)

"Contents" (Malik 2014:5)

"distinguishable.societies, and especially in 'heroic' societies at the edge of historical records such as that which Homer describes, the structure of society is a given, as is the role that each individual occupies and the privileges and duties that derive from that role. A person knows who he is by knowing his role within society, and in knowing this he knows also what he owes and what is owed to him by every other individual" (Malik 2014:17)

"ners and slaves were, for instance,s all disbarred from governance. mpulse that 'rule by the many' was better than 'rule by the few', an impulse that was to shape all progressive thought in the centuries that followed" (Malik 2014:22)

"ernal. the sixth century BCE, a new kind of moral account began to develop in which ideas about what constituted a virtuous act or a good life were not implicitly crafted, and intuitively grasped, through the narrative of myth, but explicitly established through rational argument. These new accounts did not so much tell stories as ask questions." (Malik 2014:24)

"other than 'i," (Malik 2014:24)

"Thales," (Malik 2014:25)

"was not regular and ordered, but capricious and unpredictable. e both naturalistic and reductionist. Naturalistic because phenomena had to be explained without recourse to divine intervention but only by reference to natural causes and events; reductionist because complex phenomena could be understood in terms of simpler processes, and explanations of the world should rely on as few principles as possible" (Malik 2014:26)

"and in particular ab. But what is a virtue? Traditionally there were ve: courage, moderation, piety, wisdom and justice" (Malik 2014:32)

"In Plato's world, notions of the inner self were barely articulated, an individual's identity and interest were bound up entirely with the community in which he lived, the very notion of the individual was far more constrained than it is today, and ethics was a means of regulating the social roles and relationships within a community." (Malik 2014:45)

"nk. Most of these characteristics are shared with other creatures. the possession of reason. Hence the exercise of reason is the proper function of a human being. Happiness consists in acting in accordance with reason. Or, to be more precise, it means acting virtuously in accordance with reason" (Malik 2014:50)

"rtue'.Aristotle, as for Plato, ethics was subordinate to politics. The primary good was the good of the community rather than the good of the individual. Moral rules grew out of the structure of the community, and ensured the maintenance of that structure" (Malik 2014:53)

"ealize Sparta, a city that despised the freedoms granted by Athens.t we now call 'virtue theory', establishing the importance of character, community, ourishing and practical wisdom as the central themes of a virtuous life. This became the dominant ethical view over the next two millennia. Not till the eighteenth century did competing ethical frameworks develop in Kantianism and utilitarianism, the rst stressing the importance of duty and conscience, the second the signicance of the consequences of one's actions" (Malik 2014:57)

"ur actions might be fated, but we stills have to assent to our fate. he result not simply of external forces but of his or her internal character too." (Malik 2014:65)

"esar disreputably because of their respective natures.o understand the relationship between fate and free will. The trouble is, there is a hole at the heart of it because it conates the ideas of responsibility and of agency" (Malik 2014:65)

"at he presents to Moses.and harmony were experienced in the very nature of the universe (kosmos meant to the Greeks both the physical universe and a sense of order and harmony). The rules by which humans should live were to be discovered in the order of nature or to be crafted through the activities of Man" (Malik 2014:70)

"more as a means of educating the mind than of observing a law. from on high the laws inscribed in tablets of stone for all to obey. There was no discovery here, nor crafting, simply the Revelation of God's will, the disclosing of truth to, and through, a prophet." (Malik 2014:70)

"n of God's will, the disclosing of truth to, and through, a prophet. the idea of the good as revealed truth." (Malik 2014:70)

"m which both Christianity and Islam were later to bee constructed. new kind of ethics. Every Jew, Christian and Muslim believed - and still believes - that the nature of God and of the relationship between Man and God denes the moral rules by which we live. What is striking about the monotheistic religions, though, is that they combine an unyielding attachment to God's word with an immensely exible understanding of what those words mean." (Malik 2014:73)

"ilty.moral codes possess two elements: a set of values to pursue and a reason for pursuing those values; or, to put it another way, they both elucidate the means of being good and demonstrate the end to which the means take us. In ancient Greece, the virtuous life was the means. The end - the reason for submitting to such a life - changed over time. For Homer the prize was honour, for Plato justice, for Aristotle happiness." (Malik 2014:75)

"way of thinking about the relationship between means and ends. reach the end" (Malik 2014:75)

"h his brother without a caused shall be in danger of the judgment'. lk of 'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth', Jesus is adamant that 'ye resist not evil: but whoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also'.10 We are witness here to a Christian version of virtue ethics, a belief in the importance not just of performing good acts but of being a good person. It is an ethics that emerges, however, less through reasoning about the good life than by unconditionally embracing God's love." (Malik 2014:79)

"out the good life than by unconditionally." (Malik 2014:79)

"as an ethics of conformity and as a challenge to the social order. hrist return to Earth in their lifetimes. The decades passed and no Kingdom came. Christians eventually had to take a set of ethics crafted for the end of the world and transform it into one applicable for societies still stuck in history. This only deepened disagreements about how to read Jesus' words. God's word it may have been, but that word had to be read, interpreted and translated into deeds by mere mortals. The moral compass may have, in Christian eyes, derived from God, but it was humans who had to decide which way lay moral North." (Malik 2014:80)

"had felt humiliated by the betrayal, torture and execution of Christ.e Kingdom of God have been left to die as a common criminal, nailed to a cross and in bestial pain? It was Paul who began to sketch an answer. The very nature of Jesus' death, Paul argued, revealed the essential goodness of God. Jesus had been willing to die in such an unspeakable fashion to atone for human sins, revealing an unconditional love for humankind." (Malik 2014:82)

"sult of 'lust's darkness'.mpossible for humans to do good on their own account, because it degraded both their moral capacity and their willpower. Only through God's grace could humans achieve salvation." (Malik 2014:87)

"red heretics and banished from Rome. In thef struggle between n thought, two contradictory views of God, salvation and human nature that Christianity has never truly resolved. On the one hand an embrace of a loving God, on the other a sense of terror at God's wrath and vengeance; on the one hand an understanding of humans as moral agents possessed of free will and capable of good works, on the other a condemnation of humans as corrupted sinners, incapable without God's grace of telling right from wrong or acting upon it; on the one hand a belief in the Law as God's gift to humankind that called forth the moral responsibility without which believers could not enter the Kingdom of God, on the other an insistence that not through adherence to the Law but only through faith in Jesus Christ could salvation be realized." (Malik 2014:88)

"onal argument to believe without thinking out their reasons'. te of surrender or openness to Revelation but rather an absolute trust in the Church hierarchy, which alone possessed the reason to discern God's meaning. Faith had become the means of enforcing authority." (Malik 2014:91)

"as unnerved by Pelagius and his disruptive theology. developed a theology of authority and order. 'It is in the natural order of things', he preached, 'that women should serve men, and children their parents, because this is just in itself, that the weaker reason should serve the stronger.' As with family, so with society. It was given by nature for the lower orders to serve the upper orders, and for all to serve the emperor. Slavery, too, was 'ordained as a punishment by that law which enjoins the preservation of the order of nature, and forbids its disturbance'.27 War, repression and the torture even of innocent men28 were all acceptable to compel obedience and to secure order. But while the rulers of a society could take punitive action to defend social peace, individuals had no such right. In Augustine, the theologian John Rist observes, 'the powers of ordinary citizens are almost non-" (Malik 2014:92)

"existent'. Plato and Aristotle, Rist adds, who themselves worried about the mob and feared for social peace, nevertheless 'would have shuddered at such an empty concept of citizenship'.29" (Malik 2014:93)

"the existence of free will made social renewal an imperative. humans had to follow authority, whether that of God, bishops or the emperor" (Malik 2014:93)

"eir history has been their importance as a bedrock oft moral values. our moral truths or truly know right from wrong. Without belief in God we will be lost in a miasma of moral nihilism. Yet the transformation in the rst four centuries not just in the fortunes of Christianity but also in the ethical ideas that animated it reveals the exibility of religious precepts." (Malik 2014:93)

"dividual may have committed in past lives.of karma embodies an argument for free will. At a social level, however, it transforms itself into an argument for fate. Indeed, fate as a social phenomenon is justied by free will as a metaphysical claim. Your life cannot be otherwise because of past karma. Free will in the past becomes, in other words, an explanation for fatedness in the present" (Malik 2014:102)

"The Ramayana is, as the historian Romila Thapar observes, 'an epic legitimizing the monarchical state" (Malik 2014:105)

"ditional Indian philosophy.middle centuries of the rst millennium BCE is that a similar kind of social turbulence should beset all the great civilizational centres of the world. Not just in India, but in Greece, Israel, Persia and China, too, the heroic age was giving way to a more structured world at around the same time." (Malik 2014:106)

"ughe the remaking of Judaism in Israel, to Confucianism in China. s described it as the 'Axial age' in which 'the spiritual foundations of humanity were laid simultaneously and independently in China, India, Persia, Judea, and Greece" (Malik 2014:106)

"Buddhism," (Malik 2014:107)

"thought throughout Indian history" (Malik 2014:107)

"s tod s re" (Malik 2014:107)

"en projected back to establish a canonical text.ng of the Wheel of Dharma' are the Four Noble Truths. The rst truth is that the world is permeated with suering, or duhkha, a concept that refers not just" (Malik 2014:108)

"to pain and sorrow but also to dissatisfaction and unfullment. Duhkha is one of the Three Marks of Existence (trilakshana), or features of earthly life. They stamp our lives so indelibly that those who ignore their reality will nd nirvana always to be beyond their reach. The other Marks of Existence are anitya, or impermanence, and anatman, meaning 'no self' or 'egolessness'. Anitya expresses the belief that everything in the phenomenal world is in a state of ux. This includes human beings themselves. Hence anatman, or lack of self. All human existence, for the Buddha, is a series of discontinuous moments. The image he presents is of a row of unlit candles. The rst candle is lit, used to light the second, but is itself then extinguished; and so on it continues down the row. Human existence, too, consists of a series of moments, lit up and snued out. Each moment of consciousness gives birth to the next and then ceases to be, so no person is constant from one moment to the next. For Buddhists, the belief that humans possess a self, that there is an essential 'me', is part of the illusion of permanence that must be discarded if an individual is to achieve enlightenment" (Malik 2014:109)

"scarded if an individual is to achieve enlightenment.he cause of all suering is human desire, the thirst for that which cannot satisfy, including the desire to be a self. Originally a place of bliss, the world had been reduced to a place of suering by human capitulation to desire, a sentiment that was, half a millennium later, to be echoed in certain strands of Christian thought, though in Buddhism the cause of degradation is not sin, as in Christianity, but ignorance. Suering can only be ended through renunciation of all desire, the third of the Noble Truths. Renunciation of desire is the path to nirvana, or liberation from rebirth, the Buddhist version of the Hindu idea of moksha. Like Hindus, Buddhists believe in the cycle of birth, death and rebirth in a new form that is the inevitable burden of human life. Only through enlightenment - moksha or nirvana - can one break that endless cycle. What rebirth means when one does not possess a self, and when every individual's life lacks continuity from one moment to the next, let alone from one birth to the next, is a conundrum that Buddhists have endlessly debated, and upon which arguments have endlessly foundered." (Malik 2014:109)

"The fourth Noble Truth upon which Buddha insisted was that desire can only be renounced through following the 'Eightfold Path', eight principles of actions that lead to a balanced, moderate life. These include the acceptance of the Four Noble Truths; the resolve to live according to the Buddhist way; the wisdom to adopt the right kind of livelihood, rejecting, for instance, jobs that involve killing, such as being a butcher, a hunter or a soldier; and the determination to act ethically by avoiding stealing, prohibited sexual activity, unjust speech and intoxicating drinks." (Malik 2014:110)

"to overplay the rational and humanistic quality ofe Buddhism. otle, the Buddha did not view ethics as a means of building the good life on this Earth, but rather as a means of escaping the bad life of this Earth. His teachings embody an intensely pessimistic view of the world as a place of unremitting hurt and disappointment. Suering without end in a futile round of rebirths after rebirths - that is the fate of most mortals. Escape comes through nirvana." (Malik 2014:111)

"pporting the work of the monks. large part a response to the social changes that were then convulsing India, in particular the new urbanization, the transformation of class structures and the emergence of the state. In the West, similar developments helped give rise to the monotheistic faiths. Judaism, Christianity and, as we" (Malik 2014:111)

"shall see, Islam all arose in times of great social dislocation, when the foundations of traditional ethics no longer appeared sure. God seemed essential to many as a source of moral concrete." (Malik 2014:112)

"rallel. has characterized China over the past three millennia is a combination of constant tumultuous change and historical continuity" (Malik 2014:114)

"Kongzi, or 'Master Kong" (Malik 2014:117)

"udents around him, perhaps eventually as many as three thousand.y with ethics rather than metaphysics. The central theme of his philosophy is the behaviour needed to create a harmonious society. At the heart of it are two human qualities: ren and li. Ren, the highest Confucian principle, is perhaps best translated as humaneness, or loving kindness" (Malik 2014:117)

"d this takes us to the, second of the two pivots of Confucian ethics, ion, ritual and conventional mores. 'If one is courteous but does without ritual, then one dissipates one's energy,' Kong suggested; 'if one is cautious but does without ritual, then one becomes timid; if one is bold but does without ritual, then one becomes reckless; if one is forthright but does without ritual, then one becomes rude.'4" (Malik 2014:118)

"ructure dened by li is crucial to be able properly toe express ren. s others; it is also to perform the duties and obligations required of one's role or station in life." (Malik 2014:118)

"tradition, the Mohist," (Malik 2014:120)

"o to argue for the opposite. two principles: that of 'partiality' and that of 'universality'. Someone who held to the principle of partiality, as Kong did, discounted the moral interests of other tribes or other states, or hated or despised them because they were of other tribes or other states. To adopt the principle of 'universality' did not mean, as some have suggested of Mo, that one should love strangers as much as one loves one's family, but rather that the moral interests of strangers, and of other tribes and states, must concern us as much as those of our family, that one should 'regard others' states as though regarding one's state, regard others' families" (Malik 2014:121)

"as though regarding one's family, and regard other persons as though regarding one's person'" (Malik 2014:122)

"rticularly in the premodern world. was also something quite authoritarian about Mo's morality. We can see this most clearly in his fascinating parable about the origins of, and the necessity for, the state. Through the parable Mo set out a political argument supercially similar to that of Thomas Hobbes almost two millennia later. Both Mo and Hobbes saw humans, in the state of nature prior to the creation of society, as living in a condition of constant warfare. But where Hobbes saw conict as arising out of the untrammelled pursuit of self-interest, Mo saw it as the consequence of discord over values. 'Before there were any laws or governments, every man's view of things was dierent,' wrote Mo. 'One man had one view, two people had two views, ten men had ten views - the more men, the more views. Moreover, each man believed that his" (Malik 2014:124)

"own views were correct and disapproved of those of others.' As a result people were 'unable to live in harmony' and 'people all resorted to water, re, and poison in an eort to do each other" (Malik 2014:125)

"jury'.vercome this disorder, 'the most worthy and able man in the world was selected and set up as Son of Heaven'. There could be only one standard of morality in this state, based on the principles that 'What the superior considers right, all shall consider right. What the superior considers wrong, all shall consider wrong', and 'Always agree with the superior; never follow the inferior'.12 This Mo calls 'conforming upwards'. Mo's state is absolutist, and the authority of its ruler absolute." (Malik 2014:125)

"ilosophy. If Confucianism was the yin, Daoism was the yang.ms of shamanism and folk religions. It expressed as much an attitude and a way of life as a philosophy, and its threads can be found in many religions and worldviews. Its formal roots lie in two literary classics. The rst is Dao De Jing, a book that, with the Analects, is regarded as the highest peak of classical Chinese literature. By tradition the Dao De Jing was written by Lao Tzu in the sixth century BCE" (Malik 2014:126)

"'great master', is probably a gure of myth. The book was most likely compiled some two centuries later; the earliest copy we possess today dates from around 200 BCE. The second classic Daoist work is the eponymously titled Chuang Tzu. Unlike Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu was a historical gure, who lived at the end of the fourth century BCE. How much of the book, if any, he actually wrote is unknown." (Malik 2014:127)

"for rulers. In Mohism, Dao is akin to a guide to morale wellbeing. e of all that exists" (Malik 2014:127)

"been inuential, not just in China and not just in the ancient world. perfect and as complete in itself. Any attempt to change or improve upon the perfection of nature, any attempt at 'civilization', can result only in disaster" (Malik 2014:127)

"n of nature, any attempt at 'civilization', can result only in disaster. tal to Daoist ethics. The more that we strive to change something, the more it remains the same. Real change occurs only when we let go of thinking and reecting, and simply follow where the Dao takes us. 'Leave all things aside to take their natural course and do not interfere,' as Lao Tzu put it" (Malik 2014:127)

"velations throughout history.n, the ideal Buddhist is the arhat ('worthy one') who has lost the fetters of ordinary existence, such as belief in the self or a desire for sex, a 'person all of whose impurities are dissolved', and 'who has laid down his burden, attained his goal, and freed his mind through perfect understanding'.16 He has, in other words, achieved nirvana. The Mahayana ideal is the bodhisattva, or 'enlightened being', who has gained enlightenment but voluntarily postpones his or her nal entry into nirvana until everyone else has also become enlightened. The arhat seeks only his liberation, the bodhisattva the liberation of all. In Theravada only monks can achieve buddhahood; in Mahayana all can potentially do so. It is a more social gospel, evincing greater compassion for the poor and the needy. For Mahayanas, compassion ranked equally with wisdom as a means of achieving salvation. More exible about the demands of scripture, more willing to adapt the Buddha's teachings to local sensitivities, more attuned to social needs, it was unsurprisingly Mahayana Buddhism that travelled better beyond the boundaries of India. Virtually all Buddhist communities outside India - in Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, Korea, Japan and China - are Mahayanan." (Malik 2014:129)

"address issues that mattered to both the ruling class and the masses. disapproval of violence and disorder. At the same time, the poor and the dispossessed were drawn to the bodhisattva ideal, the belief that enlightenment was possible for even those on the lowest rung of the social ladder." (Malik 2014:130)

"d Ch." (Malik 2014:130)

"Such koans aim to force adherents to abandon language and reason, and to take a leap into the intuitive. It was this approach that eventually made Zen so appealing to hippies and New Agers in the West." (Malik 2014:130)

"y labelled this reworking of Confucian thought 'Neo-d Confucianism'. y the most inuential Chinese philosopher of the second millennium, was Zhu Xi (1130-1200)." (Malik 2014:131)

"ve him the leisure to become a productive scholar.mulation of the traditional concepts of li and qi. For Zhu, li meant not just propriety, the obligatory order of social relations and the rituals and etiquette necessary to maintain that order. It meant also the essence of an object or phenomenon. It is what makes a thing that which it is. Li is the 'dogness' that makes a dog a dog or the 'bookness' that makes a book a book. A book is a book because it embodies the essence of a book and not that of a dog or a rose or a chair." (Malik 2014:132)

"ok and not that of a dog or a rose or a chair.i. Li gives the dog its dogness, a book its bookness. Qi is the material that makes manifest the dogness and the bookness, that turns the abstract essence into an actual dog or a book. It is not the same as matter or stu, but is more like a 'cosmic force' or energy." (Malik 2014:132)

"oral behaviour; it is also nature and the structure of the universe.hu calls 'the Supreme Ultimate'. It is abstract, beyond time and space, the source of things and forces and phenomena in the universe. 'The Supreme Ultimate', Zhu wrote, 'is what is highest of all, beyond which nothing can be. It is the most high, most mystical, and most abstruse, surpassing everything.'17 Zhu's Supreme Ultimate is reminiscent of the Dao as Daoists understood it," (Malik 2014:132)

"In humans, li was, for Zhu, the essence of being human; it was, in other words, the abstract expression of human nature. As such, the li for all humans was the same. Li, Zhu insisted, 'is nothing but good, for since it is Li, how could it be evil?' So why are some humans bad? Why does evil exist? Because, argues Xhu, li - human nature - has to be embodied in qi - the material or force that actually makes up a human individual. 'Those who receive a Qi that is clear are the sages in whom the nature is like a pearl lying in clear cold water. But those who receive a Qi that is turbid are foolish and degenerate in whom nature is like a pearl lying in muddy water" (Malik 2014:133)

"u writes, 'and the principle of Nature operates freely, that is ren.'a sophisticated melding of traditional Confucian ethics with an" (Malik 2014:133)

"elaborate metaphysics and cosmology. It is a synthesis that held for most of the second millennium. Not till dynastic rule itself crumbled in the twentieth century, and Confucianism lost its privileged place in society, were Zhu's theories dethroned" (Malik 2014:134)

"to develop and innovate the nation's intellectual heritage. al and economic changes overthrew the old order and created fertile ground for new scientic, political, philosophical and ethical thinking. That never happened in China." (Malik 2014:134)

"CHAPTER SEVEN Faith and power 1" (Malik 2014:135)

"ligious economy.of the Ka'ba transformed the fortunes of Mecca. It also eroded the tribal ethic" (Malik 2014:137)

"ber.e Mecca's growing auence acted as an acid to this philosophy. o only a few families and helped create an ever more stratied society. The weak, the inrm and the dispossessed were denied not simply access to the new-found wealth but to the protection that came from the old tribal ideals too." (Malik 2014:137)

"uslims itself an expression of the text's divine provenance.of God is, for Muslims, strengthened by the fact that Muhammad was illiterate, a condition that possesses the same emotional charge in the Islamic tradition as Mary's virginity does in Christian belief: it is both" (Malik 2014:139)

"evidence of a divine miracle and an expression of the Prophet's personal purity" (Malik 2014:140)

"Like many around him, Muhammad was sorely troubled by the erosion of the traditional norms of tribal society, the wearing down of the idea of the collective good and the growing immiseration of large sections of the Meccan population" (Malik 2014:140)

"Two themes dominated Muhammad's Revelations: the religious and the social. Humanity's destiny, Muhammad insisted, lies with God and one is lost if one thinks otherwise. The name that Muhammad gave his God - Allah - was the name by which Arabs already knew their god. He was, however, not a tribal deity, but a universal power. There was, for Muhammad, only one God, omniscient, omnipotent, yet, in the words of the opening sura, 'compassionate' and 'merciful'. Muhammad's new kind of God demanded not simply submission (the literal meaning of Islam) but also a new kind of society. Like Jesus on the Mount, Muhammad, in some parts of the Revelation at least, denounces the actions and attitudes of the rich and the powerful and decries the mistreatment and exploitation of the weak and the oppressed" (Malik 2014:141)

"nifs, who preached the virtues of a single God.arriage of belief in a single, transcendent, omnipotent God to a social ethic that echoed traditional tribal ideas of virtuous behaviour but that also challenged the mores of the Meccan ruling elite, and that appealed to large sections of a society disenchanted with the transformation of their world." (Malik 2014:141)

"the moral guidance of Allah, the rst day of the Muslim era. an armed struggle with the Quraysh, especially over the allimportant trade routes." (Malik 2014:142)

"al form and out of which Islam acquired its initial shape and temper. ective leadership. In Medina, power was vested solely in Muhammad, a man whose authority as Prophet and Lawgiver came from God and so could not be challenged." (Malik 2014:142)

"much that is distinctive about the ethics of Islam is itself revealing. ia. There was in Mecca unhappiness at the impact of the Ka'ban taxes and a sense of moral drift that Muhammad sought to address. He did so not by creating a novel moral framework but by drawing upon pre-existing notions of right and wrong and of virtuous behaviour" (Malik 2014:143)

"the same way asw Christianity had - through establishing not so ason for being moral. Morality was anchored in Allah's will. Prayer and alms-giving were required by God. So was the annihilation of enemies. The butchering of the Quarayzah was, in Muhammad's eyes, a moral necessity, an act sanctied by God." (Malik 2014:143)

"the idea of belongingness and the morala shape of the community. only those born into it could become members. In Medina, Muhammad's followers dened themselves as the ummah, whose boundaries were set not by race, ethnicity or descent but by conviction. Anyone could join Muhammad's community by avowing that 'There is no god but God and Muhammad is God's Messenger'." (Malik 2014:143)

"th the Stoics and been further elaborated by Christians.anscendent, omniscient, omnipotent, absolutely good God helped consecrate the idea of a rule-based morality. Goodness was to be found not in the cultivation of laudable habits, or in the aspiration to wisdom through self-examination, but in the ability to accept unconditionally God's law and to follow faithfully the rules that He set down for entry to heaven. As with Christianity, Islam combined an ethics as malleable as clay with the iron rod of God's word." (Malik 2014:144)

"656. His accession to the caliphate sparked the rst Musli. Right from the beginning, then, Islam cleaved along political lines. What began as political faction ghting mutated over time into theological distinctions. The Sunnis and the Shia, for instance, grew out of the early power blocs that fought over Muhammad's succession. The Shi'atu Ali ('the party of Ali') wished to restrict the caliphate to Muhammad's descendants. The Sunnis emerged in part out of another early power bloc, the Shi'atu Uthman ('the party of Uthman'), that took a more pragmatic view, arguing that leadership should be vested with those politically most capable of maintaining order and stability in the ummah." (Malik 2014:146)

"ch for the vigour and vim of Arab armies, sinews stiened by Godr Muhammad's death, the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia, Persia, Syria and Egypt had been conquered. By the early eighth century the Muslim Empire stretched from Sindh in the east to Iberia in the west" (Malik 2014:147)

"by the rules of right conduct as dened by the Prophet's behaviour. fy his divine right to rule or to establish how one ought to live according to the Qur'an. So a new class of religious scholars emerged to perform that function. The ulama or 'learned ones' took upon themselves the responsibility of guiding the ummah according to God's will. They came to hold extraordinary power in shaping the beliefs and practices of the Muslim community. The ulama wielded its power in a dierent way to Christian clergy. In Christianity, faithfulness was dened primarily through correct belief, hence the fractious debates and schisms over doctrines such as the divinity of Christ and the nature of the Trinity. Belief is clearly important within Islam, too, but faithfulness is dened less by right belief than by correct practice. It is a distinction between what philosophers call orthodoxic and orthopraxic faiths. The one and only belief required of a convert to Islam is simple - 'There is no god but God, and Muhammad is God's messenger'. Al-Ghazali, one of the most important philosophers of traditional Islam, set out three basic beliefs that could not be challenged: belief in a single God; belief in the Qur'an as God's word" (Malik 2014:147)

"as revealed to Muhammad; and belief in the existence of an afterlife. Beyond these beliefs what is truly demanded of Muslims is that they are faithful to the practices required of them - in particular the Five Pillars, the basic obligations that every Muslim must satisfy to live a good and responsible life, and sharia, the comprehensive body of rules guiding the life of all Muslims. It was through establishing and policing these practices that the ulama gained its power." (Malik 2014:148)

"ng of dozens of languages,, forms of law and administrative styles. Arabic should be the common language of the empire, and the one in which public records and accounts were to be kept. So there began the so-called 'translation movement', a huge project to translate local records into Arabic." (Malik 2014:151)

"ppened at all, at least in the form they did.e translation movement had come to an end largely because all the great works had already been translated and studied. By now a new movement had begun - that of original Arabic scholarship. Over the next three centuries there was in the Muslim world a remarkable ourishing of science and learning. Arab scholars revolutionized astronomy, invented algebra, helped develop the modern decimal number system (a rudimentary version of which they had discovered in India), established the basis of optics, and set the ground rules of cryptography" (Malik 2014:152)

"e so-called 'Judaeo-Christian' tradition, is dicult to overstate.most important and inuential of which was Kitab al-Shifa, or Book of Healing. A philosophical encyclopaedia, it is divided into four parts that deal with logic, physics, mathematics and metaphysics. Ibn Sina summarizes here the rational argument about God and faith, making" (Malik 2014:153)

"a case not just for the existence of God but also for Islamic social and ethical practices. He does so, however, with barely a mention of the Qur'an. Rather he stands his argument unaided upon reason. Abu al-Walid Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Rushd, or Ibn Rushd (1126-96), was the supreme Muslim interpreter of Aristotle and the Muslim philosopher with the greatest inuence upon the nonMuslim world" (Malik 2014:154)

"There was during the Abbasid period (750-1258) an extraordinary ourishing of freethinking, of a kind unseen since the height of Greek philosophy, and that would be unseen again until the Enlightenment. Dubbed ziddiqs, or 'heretics', by the authorities, many posed an open challenge to Islamic dogma. The most celebrated of the freethinkers was Abul Ala al-Ma'arri (c973-1058), sometimes known as the Eastern Lucretius for his uninching religious scepticism: They all err—Moslems, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians: Humanity follows two world-wide sects: One, man intelligent without religion, The second, religious without intellect.5 Born in Syria, al-Ma'arri was struck down at an early age by smallpox, which was eventually to lead to blindness. He is one of the greatest poets in the Arab tradition. His most famous work, The Epistle of Forgiveness, in which he describes visiting paradise and meeting Arab poets of the pagan period, bears comparison to Dante's Divine Comedy. Not Revelation, nor tradition nor authority but only reason, alMa'arri insisted, should guide human life: Traditions come from the past, of high import if they be True; Ay, but weak is the chain of those who warrant their truth. Consult thy reason and let perdition take others all: Of all the conference Reason best will counsel and guide. Religion, al-Ma'arri insisted, was like a 'pasture full of noxious weeds', a 'fable invented by the ancients', to hold the masses in thrall:" (Malik 2014:158)

"Ibn Rushd and al-Ma'arri represented the two poles of the Rationalist worldview, the one establishing reason as the equal of Revelation, the other dismissing Revelation in its entirety. Both were to be inuential, but neither within the Islamic tradition. Ironically, it was in Christian Europe that their philosophies found their greatest following." (Malik 2014:160)

"Rationalists. Born in Tus, in what is now north-eastern Iran, al-Ghazali (c10561111) came to be one of the most important philosophers, theologians and jurists of medieval Islam. Appointed to the prestigious Nizamiyya Madrassa in Baghdad, he published a series of books challenging the falsafah school. What distinguished alGhazali from the myriad other critics of falsafah was his use of the method of the faylasufs to attack the content of their arguments. Rationalist claims about God, the cosmos and human nature, he insisted, were wanting in reason." (Malik 2014:160)

"ars later, at Nishapur, in eastern Iran.was seeking in Susm, in the 'light which God infused into [my] heart'.8 The transcendent, he came to believe, could neither be apprehended by the senses nor described by human language, nor yet discovered through reason, but was ineable. The ultimate goal of the seeker of truth was the pure beatic experience that comes with the annihilation of the self and its absorption into God. Reading Su literature, al-Ghazali writes in his autobiography, made him realize that both theological convictions and good deeds were by themselves insucient for gaining redemption in the afterlife. Good spiritual being was necessary too. This conviction led al-Ghazali to write his masterpiece, The Revival of the Religious Sciences, a comprehensive guide to ethical behaviour in everyday life." (Malik 2014:163)

"The two major strands of Islam - Sunni and Su - reect the two sides of al-Ghazali's argument. The one enforced piety through policing the strict observance of God's law as dened by the Qur'an, Sunna and sharia; the other sought a more mystical, esoteric route to the divine, seeking 'the reparation of the heart' by 'turning it away from all else but God" (Malik 2014:166)

"owledge.t important of these early collectors was the Italian poet Francesco Petrarca, known in English as Petrarch, who is of ten called the 'father of humanism'. Petrarch it was who coined the term 'the Dark Ages' to describe the millennium that separated the end of antiquity and the beginnings of the Renaissance. It is to Petrarch, too, that we owe the word 'Renaissance', the 'rebirth' of culture and learning after the Dark Ages had expunged the ame lit by the great poets of Greece and Rome" (Malik 2014:187)

"anists were humanist in a dierent, and more modern, sense too. mportance of humanity, and in particular of what many called the 'dignity of man" (Malik 2014:189)

"eativity of human reason. expression of this came in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's celebrated oration on 'The Dignity of Man" (Malik 2014:189)

"s views, even writing an Apologia defending his arguments.soul, the most brilliant, learned, revered and inuential humanist of his age." (Malik 2014:190)

"was compelled to do as he had.hism in sixteenth-century Western Christendom out of which Protestantism emerged, is usually seen as the great leap forward, not just in Christianity but also in modernity" (Malik 2014:192)

"the next world.ove the good because it is good, Socrates had wondered in Plato's Euthyphro, or is something good because it is loved by the gods? Luther's answer, like that of Muslim Traditionalists, was unambiguous. There was no rhyme or reason to God's law. Humans had to accept God's idea of the good simply because God tells us it is good, not because they could justify it through reason or through any external measure. Morality was indeed arbitrary. That was the whole point of it." (Malik 2014:195)

"cked.yet, despite the Reformation's mordantly reactionary soul, its rebellion against the Catholic Church was also the source of a radical revolution, the harbinger of a liberal modernity. The paradox of the Reformation is that a movement that deprecated autonomy and will, insisted on the unlimited sovereignty of God and sought solace in unquestioning faith also helped create a world that came to celebrate individualism, foster agency and take secularism to be the social norm" (Malik 2014:196)

"cience, each fostering his ore her own personal relationship to God. llion was an assertion of individual conscience against the monolithic authority of the institutional Church" (Malik 2014:196)

"tree of life helped ironically to engineer the modern secular world. at happened to them in the next world. Neither good works, nor moral acts nor yet penitence provided the key to salvation. Faith and grace were all that mattered. So what sort of laws should guide human conduct in this world? Since there was no point in designing rules of conduct to get humans into the next world, such rules could reect the needs of this one. Hence the Reformation created the possibility of a secular space dened by laws that defended political rather than divine order. It was an argument that clearly appealed to monarchs and princes chang at the constraints imposed by Papal power. By the thirteenth century the Church had achieved an unprecedented level of political authority in Western Europe. It was also riddled with corruption, shot through with sleaze, and had become a machine for minting money and grasping power. In 1492 Pope Alexander VI, a member of the Borgia family, had artfully bribed his way to the Papacy, despite having several mistresses and at least seven known illegitimate children. Forty years earlier, Duke Amadeus VIII of Savoy had managed to get his eight-year-old son appointed as the Bishop of Geneva. If the higher clergy were lacking in any sense of moral virtue, the lower clergy were of ten illiterate, uncouth and ignorant. Little wonder that huge resentments had built up against Papal power. The so-called 'magisterial Protestantism', the Protestant rebellion led by the elite, swept through much of Northern and Central Europe, from the Swiss cantons, and the German-speaking lands of the Holy Roman Empire, to Bohemia, Poland and the Baltic states to the east and through the Netherlands to England to the north." (Malik 2014:197)

"rsion of Protestantism one of the most inuential.from the Pope to carve out a space for secular rule" (Malik 2014:198)

"ed power away from the Pope to carve out a space for secular rule. e ultimate source of political authority. Rather, God was now called upon to authorize the rule of His secular representatives on Earth." (Malik 2014:198)

"Catholic kings, too, such as Louis XIV of doctrine of divine right. There was another paradox too. Luther had insisted that actions in this world had no bearing on one's reception in the next; hence the possibility of creating a secular space. In practice, however, the spread of Luther's message led to the greater fusion of Church and State. As kings and princes cleaved to the Reformation as a means of gaining power, so the institutions of faith and the institutions by which they enforced their rule became barely distinguishable. A movement that began by asserting the right of every individual to interpret the Bible as he or she wished soon realized that this would lead to religious and social anarchy. Each of the various strands of Protestantism established its own institutions to enforce its particular doctrines and rituals and to eliminate heresy, of ten on" (Malik 2014:198)

"the pain of death. A movement that had begun by challenging the corruption of the Catholic Church through its acquisition of secular power, and had insisted on the distinction between divine law and worldly law, soon fused Church and State as a means of defending the power of both, the Church sheltering in the bosom of princely" (Malik 2014:199)

"ods. For Aquinas, moral law rested in God's will.ion of traditional communities and the growth of religious scepticism had, through the early modern period, corroded the ability of both God and community to warrant moral behaviour" (Malik 2014:203)

"responses to this challenge. One was the waspish Englishman." (Malik 2014:203)

"Thomas Hobbes, the other the quiet Dutchman Baruch Spinoza.s wake come Locke, Hume, Bentham and Mill. Spinoza helped shape what is now of ten called the 'Continental' tradition. Thinkers as diverse as Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche are all in his debt." (Malik 2014:203)

"arrant moral behaviour.obbes and Spinoza was the work of a third seventeenth-century philosopher, whose ideas about the individual and individual consciousness have probably had a greater inuence on modern thinking than that of any other gure, who not only gave philosophical shape to the new idea of the 'inner self' but in doing so helped lay the ground for modern philosophy and establish the key modern conundrum about human nature: René Descartes." (Malik 2014:204)

"ere was, for Montaigne, no absolute truth.we be certain? This was the question that Descartes addressed in his most famous work, Discourse on Method. Published in 1637" (Malik 2014:205)

"in his most famous work,y Discourse on Method. Published in 1637 It contains perhaps the best known line in all of philosophy: cogito ergo sum. 'I think, therefore I am.' Paradoxically, Descartes observed, the very fact that he was able to doubt revealed the one thing of which he could be sure: that he existed, and existed as an entity that could think. For if he doubted, he must exist in order to doubt." (Malik 2014:205)

"much of modern thinking about humanf nature and our moral lives. ning feature of a human being and as a means of acquiring truth. Prior to Descartes, scholars discussed reason as a general condition of being, not as the product of an individual's mind. When Descartes writes that 'I' did this or that, he does so in a much more modern sense - as a personal reection on his thoughts and the workings of his own mind. The Discourse is written almost as a narrative, with Descartes himself as the hero, in search of the Holy Grail of truth. With Descartes the mind became fully interior and the private possession of the individual. If human beings were thinking substances, nature was a machine. This was the second principle that permeated the work of Descartes. It was a view in direct contrast to that of Aristotle, for whom the cosmos was more like an organism than a machine. In the new philosophy articulated by Descartes the teleological view of nature was banished. The Aristotelian universe, full of purpose and desire, gave way to an inert universe composed of purposeless particles each pursuing its course mindless of others. Here were the philosophical foundations of modern science" (Malik 2014:205)

"ort'.re are no laws in the state of nature, because laws only come with society. But if there are no humanly created laws, there are laws of nature, key among which is the principle of rational selfinterest" (Malik 2014:208)

"nature, key among which is the principle of rational selfinterest. ttered liberty they possess in their natural state in return for" (Malik 2014:208)

"safety, to 'be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself'.7 This is the covenant between all citizens out of which society is born. To police the covenant, people transfer their rights, save that of self-defence, to a central power that ensures that no one reneges on their agreement to limit their own rights, and is able to enforce law by punishment. This central authority Hobbes calls the Commonwealth. The supreme ruler is himself not party to the covenant and so is incapable of breaching it. Such a sovereign is the source of law and property rights in the new society, and it is his function to enforce the covenant and protect his subjects. Hobbes accepted that the supreme power could be an 'Assembly of men' or of 'one Man'. But even an assembly would be no democracy. The power of the ruler, whether an individual or an assembly, had to be absolute. The only liberty a subject possessed was the liberty to do anything not regulated by the sovereign. Even in society, however, the right of every individual to self-preservation is absolute. If the sovereign threatens this right to self-preservation, then the subject had 'the Liberty to disobey'. Hobbes was the rst of the modern 'social contract' theorists, for whom society is created through voluntary agreement between its members." (Malik 2014:209)

"philosophy much further than Descartes himself wasf willing to. ance, mental and material. Spinoza insisted on but one reality and one set of rules governing the whole of that reality, of which humans were an intimate part. There existed a single substance, which Spinoza called Deus sive Natura - 'God or Nature' - a substance that possessed the attributes both of thought and of space. Mind and body do not, as in the Cartesian universe, belong to separate realms; they are inseparable from each other and from the rest of reality." (Malik 2014:213)

"lf-transformation.of Spinoza lies not in his claim that things cannot be otherwise but in his belief that the human condition can be rationally understood and that out of this understanding emerge the tools with which we can transform ourselves" (Malik 2014:215)

"any other moral philosopher before him, more even than Aristotle, and desires not as given but as transformable. The most signicant transformation, for Spinoza, was from being a slave to one's passions to being an agent of one's change. The development of human powers becomes the end of moral and political life. This vision of human transformation not only distinguished Spinoza from Hobbes but also made him the patron saint - if anyone so Godless could be described as a patron saint - of the radical wing of the intellectual storm that was to sweep through eighteenth-century Europe: the Enlightenment." (Malik 2014:215)

"'What is Enlightenment?', Immanuel Kant To the question emergence from his self-incurred tutelage', from the 'lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's guidance'.12 For Kant and Voltaire, for Hume and Diderot, and all the philosophes, the importance of the Enlightenment was that it cleansed the European mind of medieval superstition and allowed the light of reason to shine upon human problems. This was, of course, a self-serving denition, and one that airily dismissed pre-Enlightenment intellectual traditions upon many of which the philosophes drew, but it was also one that gave a sense of the historical signicance of the Enlightenment." (Malik 2014:216)

"mocracy'.on of 'humanity' possessed, in the eighteenth century, a number of dierent meanings, some harking back to old denitions, some carving out new ones. From the late Middle Ages on, humanity had been synonymous with gentleness, courtesy and politeness" (Malik 2014:217)

"ity was an expression not merely of civility but also of civilization. anity as representing the qualities, especially the moral and ethical qualities, that pertain specically to humans. Humanity in this sense was distinct from barbarity. The moral dimension of being human was of immense importance to Enlightenment philosophes." (Malik 2014:217)

"meaning of humanity as that which is distinct from thee divine. ter of one's own destiny, independently of divine intervention." (Malik 2014:217)

"nerve'.were, in fact, two Enlightenments, as Jonathan Israel points out in his magnicent trilogy, Radical Enlightenment, Enlightenment Contested and Democratic Enlightenment" (Malik 2014:218)

"ory of the Enlightenment and of its impact upon the modern world. me is the one of which we know and which provides the public face of the 'Age of Light'. But it was the Radical Enlightenment, shaped by lesser-known gures such as d'Holbach, Diderot, Condorcet and, in particular, Spinoza, whose atheism, monism and radicalism turned him into the driving force of the Radical movement, that provided the Enlightenment's heart and soul. The two divided, according to Israel, on the question of whether reason reigned supreme in human aairs, as the Radicals insisted, or whether reason had to be limited by faith and tradition - the view of the mainstream. This distinction, Israel suggests, was to shape the attitudes of the two sides to a whole host of social and political issues such as equality, democracy and colonialism. The mainstream's intellectual timidity constrained, in Israel's view, its critique of old social forms and beliefs. By contrast, the Radical Enlightenment 'rejected all compromise with the past and sought to sweep away existing structures entirely'. The Radicals were driven to pursue their ideas of equality and democracy to their logical conclusions because, having broken with traditional concepts of a God-ordained order, there was no 'meaningful alternative  …  to grounding morality, political and social order on a systematic radical egalitarianism extending across all frontiers, class barriers and horizons'. In Israel's view, what he calls the 'package of basic values' that denes modernity - toleration, personal freedom, democracy, racial equality, sexual emancipation and the universal" (Malik 2014:218)

"right to knowledge - derives principally from the claims of the Radical Enlightenment" (Malik 2014:219)

"ational society would require root and branch transformation.moral philosophers. Yet in their ideas we can see a decisive turn in the quest for the moral compass" (Malik 2014:219)

"lia as well as in America, even if we have not been to either place. n the behaviour of entities in the observed present will persist into the future, and throughout the unobserved present. But, Hume insisted, we cannot rationally justify that belief. It is not reason but natural instinct, the given way our minds work, that leads us to make such inferences. Similarly with causation. Just as humans have a tendency to search for regularities in the world, so they have a tendency to see the world in terms of cause and eect. However, as with inductive inference, our perception of causation is, Hume insists, a product of the way our minds work, not of the external world. Ideas of necessary causation, as Hume puts it, are 'qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and not perceiv'd externally in bodies'.3" (Malik 2014:223)

"keley, advanced empiricism to itsI logical and sceptical conclusions. servation, then what can I know beyond the contents of my own mind? The 'disastrous conclusion' from Hume's" (Malik 2014:223)

"impeccable logic seemed to be, as Bertrand Russell put it, 'that from experience and observation nothing is to be learnt" (Malik 2014:224)

"y is that, for Hume, reason is impotent to produce anyr action. n, can drive humans to act. 'Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions,' Hume insisted in one of his more notorious formulations.6 Whereas for Spinoza, reason is a means of transforming our desires, for Hume desires are the means of motivating reason." (Malik 2014:224)

"n distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice.a complex psychological disposition. It is like a passion in that it provides motive for action. It is also more than a passion, for it involves an important element of judgement. The sentiments of moral approval and disapproval are caused by the operation of 'sympathy', which is not a feeling but rather a psychological mechanism that enables one to participate in the emotional life of others; today we would probably talk of 'empathy'." (Malik 2014:225)

"lf-interest.e, then, moral duties and obligations cannot be rationally deduced from purely factual premises. Hence the failure of much traditional moral philosophy that sought through reasoned argument to deduce ought from is. He does not argue, however, that values cannot derive from the facts of the world, nor that there is an unbridgeable chasm between facts and values. Distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong, were, for Hume, the products not of reason but of a moral sense. But moral sense was itself a natural disposition, an aspect of human nature. Indeed, Hume claims that 'no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality'." (Malik 2014:227)

"Immanuel Kant" (Malik 2014:231)

"rth.e whole of Kant's philosophy can be seen as an attempt to address the challenge of Hume's scepticism" (Malik 2014:231)

"ective knowledge, and to rejectt the idea of an objective morality. m and rationalism - between the idea that all knowledge came through the senses and the claim that the mind can create knowledge through reason and its own inner workings - may be resolved if we recognize that the mind is not a passive recipient of sensation but an active organizer of sense impressions into" (Malik 2014:231)

"knowledge" (Malik 2014:232)

"The most moral person is the one who chosen to act in that fashion. desires and chooses to act against them, knowing it is his or her duty to do so." (Malik 2014:234)

"em, knowing it is his or her duty to do so.Kant makes a distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. An imperative is a directive about what one should do. A hypothetical imperative is a conditional directive." (Malik 2014:234)

"is about the means by which to arrive at a particular end.ategorical imperative" (Malik 2014:234)

"demands: 'Cheat whoever you can'; 'Never serve black people.' at makes it moral and transforms it into my duty" (Malik 2014:234)

"rical imperative that makes it moral and transforms it into my duty? important of which are that they can be made universal and that they do not confuse means and ends." (Malik 2014:234)

"made universal and that they do not confuse means and ends. the underlying principle for an act) had to be one that could apply to everyone - including oneself" (Malik 2014:234)

"t the way that you would wish someone else to act towards you. e happy to be the object as well as the subject." (Malik 2014:234)

"ould be happy to be the object as well as the subject.perative is that it treats other people as ends, not means." (Malik 2014:234)

"e idea of eudaimonia and to the virtue ethicsn of Plato and Aristotle. me central to modern perceptions of human worth and of human rights." (Malik 2014:235)

"it? The answer is not clear - as always, itt depends upon the context. oral to tell the truth. But the whole point about the categorical imperative is that it is independent of context. It is categorical and does not allow for exceptions. Context matters because we live in an imperfect world" (Malik 2014:235)

"life. Eighteenth-" (Malik 2014:237)

"ite fullled, a life that remained imperfect?in which the greatest happiness accrued to the greatest number" (Malik 2014:240)

"cause it had not been examined'.theory, he remains an important moral philosopher, whose work transformed ethical thinking in two ways. First, the insistence that good and bad, right and wrong, should be dened not by motive or intention but by consequence was historically revolutionary. In the two centuries since Bentham, a whole host of consequentialist theories have emerged, each of which evaluates consequences according to dierent criteria. Utilitarianism - which judges consequences according to the degree of happiness or unhappiness, of pleasure and pain, produced - is only one kind of" (Malik 2014:241)

"consequentialist theory, but the most inuential. Non-utilitarian consequentialists may evaluate an act in terms not of pleasure and pain but of other goods such as justice, fairness or equality" (Malik 2014:242)

"in but of other goods such as justice, fairness or equality.previously dominated moral thinking, that certain kinds of actions are intrinsically wrong and should never be performed, irrespective of the consequences. He challenged, in other words, the idea of the moral absolute." (Malik 2014:242)

"John Stuart Mill" (Malik 2014:242)

"termining whether an act is good or bad.oo, of another distinction that has become important in consequentialist theory - that between an act and a rule" (Malik 2014:244)

"al Sin, of thel" (Malik 2014:247)

"other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom'. ng was, as Friedrich Engels was later to put it, 'the exceptional historical sense underlying' it.2 It was Hegel who, above all others, wove history into philosophy, and into human nature, insisting that neither could be understood without seeing both as phenomena that come to be, rather than just exist. In this he posed a challenge not simply to the Hobbesian idea of a static, given human nature that had dominated much of eighteenthcentury thought, but also to virtually the whole of moral philosophy." (Malik 2014:248)

"e evere read Hegel. Yet there is a Hegelian spirit in that observatio." (Malik 2014:249)

"d and primed, ready for his wants and desires to be satised. But which he yearns, Hegel observed, are not, and could not be, ready-made to be used 'out of the box'. They must also be shaped by the social milieu in which he nds himself and the possibilities that present themselves to him. The desire to live in one way rather than another, Hegel recognized, cannot be the same in all societies, in all ages." (Malik 2014:249)

"manifests itself in concrete reality. T Hegel's historical view of ideas was part of a broader cultural shift, the emergence of the Romantic sensibility." (Malik 2014:250)

"ore Hegel had simply assumed the existence of the human subject. . An isolated individual could not be truly self-conscious, nor act as an agent. I become conscious of my self only as I become conscious of others and of my relationships with them. Humans are not individuals who become social but social beings whose individuality emerges through the bonds they create with each other." (Malik 2014:252)

"leadingu" (Malik 2014:255)

"-realization of human individuals happens only through others. between 'selshness' and 'self-realization' is signicant. 'Selshness' conveys the idea that individual interests are expressed through the individual alone, that they would and do exist independently of society, and that social interests comprise an aggregate of individual interests. 'Self-realization' is the recognition that individual interests can be expressed only through society, that one only comes to realize what one's interests are in relation to others, and that while individual interests may well conict with those of society, they cannot exist independently of them. It is a distinction that is still little understood and too often ignored." (Malik 2014:256)

"Karl Marx" (Malik 2014:261)

"harm'.aversion to ideas of duty, right, truth, morality and justice could not have been made clearer." (Malik 2014:261)

"e, but must always be hidden away wh" (Malik 2014:261)

"om Engels said that he was the only person who understood Capital, ocialist systems by its anti-ethical tendency. In all of Marxism from beginning to end, there is not a grain of ethics, and consequently no more of an ethical judgment than an ethical postulate" (Malik 2014:261)

"Marx was not, however, an amoralist or an anti-moralist. He rejected morality based on ideas of duty or utility or self-interest or moral sense. He rejected the morality of 'thou shalt' and 'thou shalt not'. He did not reject morality as such" (Malik 2014:263)

"hat of the, 'development of all abilities of the whole person'. tle, the key question was not about how best to foster human ourishing in this society within a given structure. It was, rather, about the kind of society necessary to allow humans to ourish in this fashion. This was why his attitude to morality can appear so ambivalent." (Malik 2014:264)

"For Marx, the point of revolutionary change was to create the conditions for self-realization." (Malik 2014:268)

"ed upon as a defence alibi. It" (Malik 2014:271)

"ern sickness - 'the onen immortal blemish of mankind', he called it. moral devaluation of this one, and hence to a false spirituality, it had also come to embody values destructive of moral life." (Malik 2014:273)